Question composition

Semantics II

March 1 & 5, 2018

1

The meaning of questions

Up from declaratives

The meaning of a declarative sentence is its truth conditions.

The meaning of an interrogative sentence is its

conditions.

Up from declaratives

The meaning of a declarative sentence is its truth conditions.

The meaning of an interrogative sentence is its answerhood conditions.

- One way or another, a question tells you what kind of information it seeks.
- Knowing what a question means means knowing how one could answer it.

Basic kinds of questions:

- Polar: Did you go to the party?
- Constituent/wh: Who went to the party?
- Alternative: Did JOHN or MARY go to the party?

Questions as properties

Perhaps the most intuitive kind of representation for a question like *who went to the party*? is as a property — a function of type $s \rightarrow e \rightarrow t$:

```
[who went to the party?]<sup>w</sup> = \lambda v \lambda x \in \mathbf{human}_w. party, x
```

The ' $\lambda x \in human_w$ ' indicates that this function, call it 'Q', is defined only for humans in the world of evaluation w—i.e., that:

 $Dom(Qv) = human_w$

A **short answer** like 'Bob' can simply be plugged into the question, to yield truth iff Bob went to the party (provided Bob is a human in *w*).

 $\llbracket \mathsf{Qu} \mathsf{Ans}
rbracket^w = \llbracket \mathsf{Qu}
rbracket^w w \llbracket \mathsf{Ans}
rbracket^w$

Questions as sets of alternatives

Another kind of question representation treats questions as denoting **sets of propositions** (Hamblin 1973, Karttunen 1977):

[who went to the party?]^w =
$$\underbrace{\{\lambda v. party_v x \mid human_w x\}}_{(s-t)-t}$$

The partiality condition has turned into a restriction on the kinds of propositions that together comprise the question: each is "about" some human in w.

How does this representation provide answerhood conditions?

Questions as sets of alternatives

Another kind of question representation treats questions as denoting **sets of propositions** (Hamblin 1973, Karttunen 1977):

[who went to the party?]^w =
$$\underbrace{\{\lambda v. party_v x \mid human_w x\}}_{(s \to t) \to t}$$

The partiality condition has turned into a restriction on the kinds of propositions that together comprise the question: each is "about" some human in w.

How does this representation provide answerhood conditions? A **long answer** like 'Bob went to the party' should be a member of this set (if Bob is human in *w*).

Questions as partitions

A partition is a special kind of set of propositions, where none of the propositions overlap, and together they cover all of logical space:



A partition provides answerhood conditions in the same way as a set of alternatives, but it requires answers to be more specific: a (long) answer to a question must *completely* resolve the issue the question raises.

Derivability relations

Both alternative sets and partitions can be derived from function representations (partitions can also be derived from alternatives, though we won't see that today):

$$\mathbf{ToAlt} f = \underbrace{\{f_{flip} \mid x \in \mathsf{Dom} f_{flip}\}}_{f_{flip} = \lambda x \lambda w. f w x} \qquad \mathbf{ToPart} g = \lambda w \lambda v. g w = g v$$

ToPart treats a partition as an *equivalence relation* on worlds. An equivalence relation groups together worlds that agree completely on who has property f.

Both of these mappings collapse distinctions: functions are finer-grained than alternatives or partitions. This means there are no mappings in the other directions.

Partitions, question in/ex-tensions

An elegant feature of the partition view is that it makes a natural distinction between a question intension and a question extension:

- lntension: $\lambda w \lambda v. (\lambda x. party_w x) = (\lambda x. party_v x)$
- Extension at *w*: $\lambda v. (\lambda x. party_w x) = (\lambda x. party_v x)$

This corresponds to a difference between verbs that embed question intensions and verbs that embed question extensions:

- 1. John wonders who came to the party.
- 2. John knows who came to the party.

The first says that John wonders about a question (i.e., a question intension). The second says that John knows a proposition (i.e., a question extension).

Deriving alternatives

We will focus on constituent questions, which bring up a number of important issues at the interface of syntax and semantics.

We will see a variety of ways their answerhood conditions could be captured, and a variety of ways these answerhood conditions could be compositionally derived.

From sets to characteristic functions

Repeating the alternative-set representation of questions:

[who went to the party]^{*w*} = { λv . party_{*v*} $x \mid x \in human_w$ }

We know that sets of *a*'s are isomorphic to *characteristic functions*, type $a \rightarrow t$. What characteristic function describes the set of alternatives given above?

 $\{\lambda v. \operatorname{party}_{v} x \mid x \in \operatorname{human}_{w}\} =$

From sets to characteristic functions

Repeating the alternative-set representation of questions:

[who went to the party]^{*w*} = { λv . party_{*v*} $x \mid x \in human_w$ }

We know that sets of *a*'s are isomorphic to *characteristic functions*, type $a \rightarrow t$. What characteristic function describes the set of alternatives given above?

=

 $\{\lambda v. \operatorname{party}_{v} x \mid x \in \operatorname{human}_{w}\} = \lambda p. p \in \{\lambda v. \operatorname{party}_{v} x \mid x \in \operatorname{human}_{w}\}$

From sets to characteristic functions

Repeating the alternative-set representation of questions:

[who went to the party]^{*w*} = { λv . party_{*v*} $x \mid x \in human_w$ }

We know that sets of *a*'s are isomorphic to *characteristic functions*, type $a \rightarrow t$. What characteristic function describes the set of alternatives given above?

$$\{\lambda v. party_v x \mid x \in human_w\} = \lambda p. p \in \{\lambda v. party_v x \mid x \in human_w\}$$
$$= \lambda p. \exists x \in human_w : p = \lambda v. party_v x$$

An existential quantifier have been revealed. This is very intriguing.

Question words as existential quantifiers

One reason the appearance of \exists is so intriguing is that there is a cross-linguistically robust connection between indefinites and *wh*-words (Haspelmath 1997).

Languages as varied as Chinese, Japanese, Sinhala, Tlingit, ...

Even English has words like *some+where*.

Pushing this line

What if we adopted the following very simple hypothesis about wh-words?

$$\llbracket who \rrbracket^w = \underbrace{\lambda f. \exists x \in human_w : f x}_{(e \to t) \to t} \qquad \llbracket which \rrbracket^w = \underbrace{\lambda f. \lambda g. \exists x \in f : g x}_{(e \to t) \to t}$$

This is a start, but it doesn't yet allow us to generate *sets* of propositions as semantic values for questions. To do that we'll need some extra pieces.

Fortunately, questions aren't simply declarative sentences. What do they have that declaratives are missing?

Pushing this line

What if we adopted the following very simple hypothesis about wh-words?

$$\llbracket \mathsf{who} \rrbracket^w = \underbrace{\lambda f. \exists x \in \mathsf{human}_w : f x}_{(e-t)-t} \qquad \llbracket \mathsf{which} \rrbracket^w = \underbrace{\lambda f. \lambda g. \exists x \in f : g x}_{(e-t)-(e-t)-t}$$

This is a start, but it doesn't yet allow us to generate *sets* of propositions as semantic values for questions. To do that we'll need some extra pieces.

Fortunately, questions aren't simply declarative sentences. What do they have that declaratives are missing? **An interrogative C!** Moreover, we know that in simple *wh*-questions (i.e., with just one *wh*-word), the *wh*-word moves *above C*.

Getting started



Filling in the missing pieces (Heim 2011, Fox 2012)



Higher-typed wh words (Karttunen 1977, Cresti 1995)

Another possibility treats wh words as quantifying into questions. Using Quest to abbreviate the type of questions (i.e., Quest $::= (s \rightarrow t) \rightarrow t$), we have:

$$\llbracket who \rrbracket^{w} = \underbrace{\lambda f \lambda p. \exists x \in human_{w} : f x p}_{(e - Quest) - Quest} \qquad \llbracket which \rrbracket^{w} = \underbrace{\lambda f \lambda g \lambda p. \exists x \in f : g x p}_{(e - t) - (e - Quest) - Quest}$$

One reason this might be more attractive than treating *wh* words as having type $(e \rightarrow t) \rightarrow t$: *wh* words don't ever take scope below C, at least in English.

The proposal here predicts this, as a matter of wh semantics (if C introduces the Quest type, wh must scope above C).

Getting started



Filling in the missing pieces



Make u think

Can you define a mapping from a generalized quantifier to something that quantifies into questions — i.e., with the following type?

 $((e \rightarrow t) \rightarrow t) \rightarrow (e \rightarrow Quest) \rightarrow Quest$

Would there be any empirical concerns about such a mapping?

Suppose we treated *wh* words as properties or sets of individuals — i.e., having base type $e \rightarrow t$ (Hamblin 1973). Can you define a mapping from this to a *wh*-quantifier?

$$(e \rightarrow t) \rightarrow (e \rightarrow Quest) \rightarrow Quest$$

Are there fewer empirical concerns about such a mapping than the first one?

Last of all, in the categorial approach, it is natural to treat *wh* words as contributing very little to composition beyond a presuppositional restriction:

$$\llbracket who \rrbracket^w = \underbrace{\lambda f \lambda x \in human_w.f x}_{(e \to a) \to e \to a} \qquad \llbracket which \rrbracket^w = \underbrace{\lambda f \lambda g \lambda x \in f.g x}_{(e \to t) \to (e \to a) \to e \to a}$$

Notice that these functions are *polymorphic*: they do not care what type f returns, so long as f takes an entity as its input. Why is this important?

Last of all, in the categorial approach, it is natural to treat *wh* words as contributing very little to composition beyond a presuppositional restriction:

$$\llbracket who \rrbracket^w = \underbrace{\lambda f \lambda x \in human_w.f x}_{(e \to a) \to e \to a} \qquad \llbracket which \rrbracket^w = \underbrace{\lambda f \lambda g \lambda x \in f.gx}_{(e \to t) \to (e \to a) \to e \to a}$$

Notice that these functions are *polymorphic*: they do not care what type f returns, so long as f takes an entity as its input. Why is this important? Multiple-*wh*!

Categorial derivations are particularly simple



Mapping to partitions via ToPart, IFA



Thinking about what we've got

The two sets-of-propositions approaches are quite similar. The first seems to imply some kind of null operator movement. What kind of thing could be moving? Could it be associated with some kind of semantics?

Do multiple-wh constructions work? Do all of them work?

- 3. Who read what?
- 4. Who knows who read what?
- 5. Which linguist will be mad if we invite which philosopher?

Virtues of different approaches

Categorial semantics:

- Offers a particularly direct account of question answers.
- Can be naturally used to generate partition semantics.

Partition semantics:

- Question entailment works naturally. Any complete and total answer to who came? will entail a complete and total answer to did John come?
- Disjunctions don't fall out immediately (disjunctions of partitions are not in general partitions). But (a) the data is pretty suspect, and (b) it is easy to extend the partition theory, as Groenendijk & Stokhof (1989) show.

Disjoining questions

Generalized disjunction and entailment (Partee & Rooth 1983):

$$X \sqcup Y = \begin{cases} X \lor Y & \text{if } X, Y \colon t \\ \lambda c. X c \sqcup Y c & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \qquad X \sqsubset Y = \begin{cases} X \Rightarrow Y & \text{if } X, Y \colon t \\ \lambda c. X c \sqsubset Y c & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

A LIFT operation for turning *x* into the boss:

LIFT $x = \lambda c. c x$

Combining these to disjoin two question meanings:

 $\lambda f. f Q_1 \vee f Q_2$

It is clear that both $LIFT Q_1$ and $LIFT Q_2$ entail this.

Cresti, Diana. 1995. Extraction and reconstruction. Natural Language Semantics 3(1). 79-122. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01252885.

Fox, Danny. 2012. Lectures on the semantics of questions. Unpublished lecture notes.

Groenendijk, Jeroen & Martin Stokhof. 1989. Type-shifting rules and the semantics of interrogatives. In Gennaro Chierchia, Barbara H. Partee & Raymond Turner (eds.), *Properties, types and meaning: Volume II: Semantic issues*, 21–68. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2723-0_2.

Hamblin, C. L. 1973. Questions in Montague English. Foundations of Language 10(1). 41-53.

Haspelmath, Martin. 1997. Indefinite pronouns. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198235606.001.0001.

Heim, Irene. 2011. Compositional semantics of questions and wh-movement. Unpublished lecture notes.

Karttunen, Lauri. 1977. Syntax and semantics of questions. Linguistics and Philosophy 1(1). 3-44. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00351935.

Partee, Barbara H. & Mats Rooth. 1983. Generalized conjunction and type ambiguity. In Rainer Bäuerle, Christoph Schwarze & Arnim von Stechow (eds.), *Meaning, Use and Interpretation of Language*, 361–383. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. https://doi.org/doi.org/doi.org/10.1515/9783110852820.361.